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1 .  INTRODUCTION  
 
“The purpose of this scheme is to impose upon exist-
ing monetary and financial agencies a very much 
needed discipline by making it impossible for any of 
them, or for any length of time, to issue a kind of 
money substantially less reliable and useful than the 
money of any other.”1 
F. A. Hayek 
 
robably the best description of the state of today’s monetary system might be 
Walther Bagehot’s words: “Nothing but a revolution would effect it, and there is 
nothing to cause a revolution”2. In the absence of high inflation or recessionary 
tendencies, there is no great public clamour for a change in existing institutional arrange-
ments. It is the experience of economic crises, which provokes regularly discussions about 
reforms of the existing regime or formation of an alternative economic regime. The most 
outstanding and controversial proposal about an alteration of the current system was made 
by Friedrich August Hayek. In his book “Denationalisation of Money”, first published in 1976, 
he criticized the idea of centralized economic institutions (like central banks) and designed 
rules. In his view, both can never be as efficient as the market process guided by relative 
prices. The reason lies in the vulnerability of central banks to pressures from government 
or special interest groups and so central bankers will issue more money than socially effi-
cient to collect revenues and finance government expenditures. Thence Hayek called for 
the introduction of competition in the process of money supply to free money from poli-
tics and its inflationary pressure. 
However, much of Hayek’s book combines an economic analysis and a more or less 
pamphlet-like description of the political process. This makes it quite difficult to extract the 
essence of his theoretical analysis and his argumentation appears to be very sketchy and 
                                                 
1 All citations at the beginning of each chapter are taken from Hayek’s book “Denationalisation of 
Money” 
2 Quoted after Selgin/White (1994) p. 1745 
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crude. (Boller 1992, pp. 48-53). The goal of this thesis is to revisit Hayek’s idea and to fo-
cus on the economic implications and effects. The thesis tries to examine under which cir-
cumstances his idea of competing currencies could work. A striking feature of this ap-
proach to reconsideration is the assumption that there is no need for government interven-
tion. All institutions are regarded as a spontaneous result of the intended interaction be-
tween economic agents. The only duty of government is to provide a legal framework in 
which the process of interaction can take place. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. After the introduction, the second chapter ex-
amines the current financial system and stresses the relevance of its institutions, money, 
financial intermediation and central banking. This chapter shows that the development of 
all three of them is not necessarily subject to government intervention but rather can also 
be explained as a spontaneous result of interaction between humans. The section closes 
with an analysis of monetary policy which – especially expansionary monetary policy - is 
regarded as one of the main sources of inflation. It also offers a short description about 
two recent discussions in the conduction of monetary policy, respectively the independence 
and credibility problem. Although both are subject of several publications in the last two 
decades, they will not be part of the further work because the focus lies on other aspects. 
Hayek’s proposal of competing currencies was hatched out of the consideration how it 
could be possible to avoid inflation. Therefore the second chapter is dedicated to a brief 
examination on inflation. It continues where the previous chapter ended and offers an ex-
planation how monetary policy is linked to the emergence of inflation. By describing the 
social and economic costs of inflation, the end of Chapter 3 provides the reasons why low 
and stable inflation is desirable. 
Chapter 4 constitutes the main part of this thesis and deals with the possibility of cur-
rency competition. In the beginning the work develops a typology of currency competition 
by proposing that the different types are determined by the money issuing instance and the 
type of money. Thus, this framework provides four possibilities: (1) Monetary Standard 
Competition (2) International Currency Competition (3) Free Banking Competition and (4) 
Private Currency Competition. Subsequently the chapter will have a closer look on every 
single type and analyses their prospects in the current financial system. Finally, the work 
goes into recent developments in the idea of currency competition as well as a short discus-
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sion about reserve banking (fractional or 100 %), as a factor for the inherent instability of 
the banking sector. 
The last chapter is dedicated to some concluding comments, where the essences of the 
previous sections will be summarized. Additionally the chapter gives a perspective on a 
possible future of monetary policy with currency competition. 
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2.  F INANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
 
“On the effects of the adoption of the proposal all I 
will add at this point is that is of course intended to 
prevent national monetary and financial authorities 
from doing many things politically impossible to avoid 
so long as they have the power to do them.” 
F. A. Hayek 
 
laborating a theory of currency competition is just possible with a basic under-
standing of the institutional framework in which a possible currency competi-
tion takes place. The link between financial institutions/financial system and 
real economic output is subject to uncountable works and publications in the last decades, 
and even if an additional description by this author will not produce further insights in this 
topic, the need for it stems from its relevance for the examined issue. Standing in the tradi-
tion of Hayek the considerations about financial institutions are made under the assump-
tion that there is no necessity of governmental intervention, but rather they are a “sponta-
neous result”3. 
2.1. Money 
One of the key problems in Economics is the role of money in the structure of eco-
nomic decisions and its effects on the economy. Because of the numerous connotations 
and variant uses of the word, it is useful to define the term and examine its different func-
tions. 
2 .1 .1 .  Def i n i t i on  o f  Mone y  
An easy and useful way to convey a correct and general impression of money is to de-
fine it as “that which constitutes means of payment” (Hart 1968 p. 427). This broad defini-
                                                 
3 Spontaneous in that sense that institutions are not designed by a single planer, but rather emerge in a 
process of sequential learning. 
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tion could be narrowed down by defining money as “anything that is generally accepted in 
payment for goods and services or in the repayment of debts” (Mishkin 2007, p. 49). Both 
definitions give a first idea about the functions of money: (1) Medium of Exchange and (2) 
Unit of Account. The third one, which is not so obvious, is its function as a Store of Value. 
A missing dimension in the definition is its function as a legal tender i.e. when it is estab-
lished by governmental rules as a satisfactory medium for settling debts in case of dispute. 
As it will be shown later, money is a product of social convergence and therefore the func-
tion as a legal tender could be neglected for now. 
2 .1 .2 .  Func t i on s  o f  Money  
Analyzing the functions of money, does not only improve the understanding of the 
monetary institutions, but is also crucial for the understanding of some aspects of currency 
competition. The reason is that in the literature about currency competition the combina-
tion of the functions “Unit of Account” and “Medium of Exchange” is often questioned. 
(Greenfield/Yeager 1983, p. 304; Boller 1992, pp. 95-100). Among the scholars seems to 
be a consensus that money serves in general three functions:4 
The starting point in this argumentation is a pure barter economy with n  individuals. 
Each of the individuals is specialized in producing one single good called ng , where n  
denotes the produced good of each n  individual. 
                                                 
4 In his book, Denationalisation of Money – The Argument Refined, Hayek distinguish between four 
functions (cash purchases of commodities and services, holding reserves for future needs, contracts for 
deferred payments and unit of account), but in his view the could be more or less deduced from the func-
tion as a medium of exchange. (Hayek 2007, p. 67) 
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Figure 1: A Barter Economy with four individuals 
Since each individual reaches a higher utility level when consuming a variety of goods, 
specialization in producing must be accompanied by exchange. In this situation one fun-
damental problem emerge: the “double coincidence of wants”. This expression was intro-
duced by Jevons and describes a situation where direct trade is only possible, when one 
individual can meet the needs of the other individual and vice-versa. A hungry tailor can 
only exchange her produced goods against bread, when the baker needs new clothes. Oth-
erwise she has to exchange her clothes into something the baker needs and these sequences 
of bilateral trades (i.e. indirect trade) will be difficult and time consuming. This time spent 
trying to exchange goods or services, is called transaction cost. A commonly accepted Me-
dium of Exchange reduces such transaction costs and makes decentralized exchange, 
specialization and division of labour possible. (Boller 1992, pp. 115-129; Hartmann 1998, p. 
7; Jones 1976, pp. 760-761; Mishkin 2007, pp. 50-51)  
The second function of money is its use to measure value in the economy i.e. a Unit 
of Account. In the sketched barter economy above, prices would be expressed in terms of 
the amount of goods being exchanged. This procedure will lead to a tremendous amount 
of prices.5 The more complex the economy is, the more costs arise to gather information 
about prices. A unit, a numéraire, which by social convention (or imposition from govern-
ment) is accepted in a society to value commodities and services sold, to compute costs, to 
reckon wealth, and to state debts, reduces again the transaction costs in an economy. 
                                                 
5 With n goods the formula that tells us the number of prices is: 
2
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(Boller 1992, pp. 107-114; Hart 1968 p. 426; Mishkin 2007, pp. 51-52). The linkage be-
tween the function of Money as a Unit of Account and Money as a Medium of Exchange 
arises from the fact, that the unit of account often has a distinct name, but is defined in 
terms of the Medium of Exchange. Before 1933 the “Dollar” (Unit of Account) was de-
fined as 0.04838 troy ounce of gold (Medium of Exchange), 90 percent fine. (White 1999, 
p. 27)  
Indirect trade can be described as a two stage sequence, where in the first stage a good 
i  is exchanged against one good n  (Medium of Exchange) and in the second stage good 
n  is exchanged against the desired good j . When the time span between the two stages 
grows, money also serves as a repository of purchasing power, as a Store of Value. (Miskin 
2007, p. 52) As we will see later, it is this function, which constitutes the starting point for 
the explanation of money demand. 
2 .1 .3 .  Evo l u t i on  o f  Mon ey  
Up until now, no governmental intervention appeared in the functions of money.6 The 
reason for that is that money is not an invention of any sovereign or governmental institu-
tion, but the result of social convergence. In every barter economy exist goods that are 
more likely to be accepted than other goods. For Menger this was a question of the degree 
of marketability (or saleableness). In the presence of transaction cost (i.e. where trade is 
costly) a more marketable good is a good that is easier to sell for a good price. Through 
communication, or trial-and-error experience, or by imitation of successful traders, market 
participants converge to the most suitable7 Medium of Exchange. (Hartmann 1998, pp. 11-
12, Selgin 1987, pp. 441-443; White 1999 pp. 3-7) 
Whereas Menger focus on the price and the cost of trade Jones (1976) provides an ex-
planation which emphasizes the importance of decentralized trade and beliefs of the mar-
ket participants. Individuals believe that a randomly encountered individual would wish to 
exchange good j  for good i  with probability ji pp , where ip  denotes the probability that 
                                                 
6 Only in the case of the unit of account when two parties have to agree upon a denomination standard. 
But also here government isn’t a necessary condition to impose a standard for contracts. Even if lenders 
would prefer an appreciating and borrowers a depreciating currency, “it seems unlikely that market forces 
would produce a predominant bias in one direct”. (Hayek 2007, pp 68-69) 
7 Suitability of good depends on (1) the ability to recognize its quality (2) its durability (3) whether it is 
divisible and fusible and (4) its portability 
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a randomly encountered trader would wish to buy/sell good i  and jp denotes the prob-
ability that a randomly encountered trader would wish to buy/sell good j . In the case of 
direct exchange, the number of encounters expected would be 
ji pp
1
, and in the case of 
indirect exchange 
jnni pppp
11
+ , where ni pp  denotes the probability that a randomly 
encountered trader would wish to exchange good i  against the medium of exchange n . 
Indirect trade takes place if and only if
jnniji pppppp
111
+>  or equivalently 
jin ppp +> . (Jones 1976, pp. 764-765) Through this approach could be shown, that in 
every barter economy a Medium of Exchange emerge, but it can also be applied on the 
Unit of Account function as well.  
The above sketched model is very simple in the sense that its traders are somewhat na-
ïve concerning both the equilibrium matching distribution (Jones simply assumes the con-
dition that the beliefs of the sellers and the buyers have to be equal) and their choice of 
strategies. There are more sophisticated approaches (Kiyotaki/Wright 1989; Ritter 1995), 
but all have in common the existence of multiple locally stable equilibrium combinations. 
This implies that a common used Medium of Exchange (full monetization) is a possible, 
but not a necessary result and is sometimes only achieved through governmental interven-
tion. This shortcoming8 could be met with the introduction of network structures. Given a 
network structure it would constitute a stable equilibrium, when all players agree on using 
the same medium of exchange. (White 1999, pp. 93-94; Jackson/Watts 20029) 
The next development money was subject to, was the transition from commodity 
money to (fiat) paper money. The first step could be interpreted as a result of efficiency 
claims. Although commodity money has all the attributes of an efficient medium of ex-
change paper money has some more advantages. Paper is highly divisible, portable and it 
can be made durable with the proper processing. However, there is no scarcity of paper10, 
                                                 
8 In the sense of Hayek’s rejection of governmental disturbances in the evolution of money 
9 Even if the paper deals with a general case i.e. strategies are A and B, it is possible to apply it on the 
evolution of a common accepted medium of exchange. 
10 The reason is that the raw material for the production of paper, wood, is at the moment sufficiently 
available. A scarcity can occur, when (a) the natural resource tree disappears or (b) the knowledge of 
paper production vanishes into oblivion. 
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so paper itself would poorly function as a commodity money. The reason why people 
started to accept paper as Medium of Exchange was, that paper money based a claim on a 
commodity like gold or silver. (Goodfriend 1991, pp. 8-9) In times of crisis governments 
often suspended the convertibility of paper currency, but it continued to be an acceptable 
Medium of Exchange. People believed that convertibility would soon be restored and ac-
cepted intrinsically worthless pieces of paper. The value of money was decoupled from the 
value of the commodity and the credibility of the money issuing institution became the 
determining force in the supply of money. (Ritter 1995, p. 135) Another reason for the last 
step could be found in the use of sophisticated accounting methods. If all transactions are 
carried out without any physically Medium of Exchange, then the commodity could easily 
be replaced by a pure nominal commodity as the numéraire (Fama 1980, p. 42). It was that 
decoupling which enabled monetary institutions to conduct monetary policy on a high level 
of intensity and triggered the discussion about currency competition as a next possible step 
in the evolution of money.11 
2 .1 .4 .  I n s i d e -Ou t s i d e  Mone y  
The last point in the considerations about money is dedicated to the difference be-
tween inside and outside money. This distinction becomes important, if we want to exam-
ine the possibility of privately issued money. Generally the term outside money refers to 
full-bodied coins (and other types of full-bodied commodity money)12 which has its origin 
outside of any commercial banking system. Outside money is an asset for its holder but not 
a liability of, or financial claim against, anyone else. Contrary, a Medium of Exchange is-
sued by a commercial bank is inside money and would represent a financial claim against it. 
(White 1999, pp. 11-12) 
2.2. Financial Intermediaries 
For nearly a half century the linkage between financial institutions and real economic 
activity was neglected. (Gertler 1988, pp. 563 – 564) After the Great Depression the fol-
lowing works focused on money as the financial variable most relevant to aggregate eco-
                                                 
11 The expression evolution to money does not refer to technological improvements, but rather to changes 
in the conception of money. 
12 The expression full-bodied is a little bit delusive, because the issued fiat money of most economies 
operates on a limited, provisional gold bullion standard. Therefore it is irredeemable and constitutes not a 
financial claim against the issued bank (mainly central banks), which classifies it as outside money. 
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nomic behaviour. Questions about the quantity of money supply were the only topic which 
appeared regularly in macroeconomic framework. In the 50’s the role of financial interme-
diation received again more attention: According to Gertler (1988), Gurley and Shaw dem-
onstrated, that the difference between developed and underdeveloped countries can be 
found in the existence of a highly organized and broad system of financial intermediation. 
They suggested that the principal channels of monetary policy may be different form the 
convention one which stresses effects on the quantity of money supply. But this shift of 
attention lasted only few years when Modigliani-Miller-Theorem came into the scientific 
discourse. In the presence of perfect markets real economic decisions were regarded inde-
pendent of financial structure. It was not until the 70’s the role of financial intermediation 
came back into the centre of attention. Gertler (1988) argued, that authors like Mishkin and 
Bernanke found out that the Great Depression was not just a matter of money supply, but 
the disruption of credit markets contributed more to explain the collapse in real activity 
(Gertler 1988, pp. 561-668) As currency competition will happen in the environment of 
financial intermediaries it will be useful to examine the functions of financial intermediaries 
and theories concerning the banking firm. 
2 .2 .1 .  The  ro l e  o f  F inan c i a l  In t e rmed ia r i e s  
The important role of financial intermediation can be deduced from following simple 
situation. Consider an economy with ih  households and if  firms, where households spend 
a certain fraction of their income and save the other fraction. If in this economy a firm 
wants to carry out an investment and has not the necessary capital, it has to lend capital. 
One possibility is to borrow it directly from the households, but as the saved fraction is 
general smaller than the investment, it will be harder to raise funds directly the greater the 
investment is. Only indirect finance using financial intermediation (i.e. an institution which 
collects all the small saved fractions) ensures the realization of investment. In today’s econ-
omy it is the primary route for moving funds from lenders to borrowers and guarantees the 
soundness of the financial system. (Mishkin 2007, pp. 23-25) 
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2 .2 .2 .  Mode l s  o f  F inan c i a l  In t e rmed ia t i on   
The Models of financial intermediation are closely related to question why financial in-
termediaries exist. The literature emphasizes three reasons why financial intermediation will 
exist in the financial market.13 
The first and maybe most important thread stresses the relevance of allocative effects 
of asymmetric information in financial markets i.e. the application of the “lemons” prob-
lem14 on financial markets. Ex ante, the financial intermediary cannot distinguish between 
“good” (lower default probability) and “bad” (higher default probability) borrowers. There-
fore the credit interest rate will incorporate a premium which serves to compensate poten-
tial losses. “Good” borrowers suffer at the expense of bad-quality borrowers, and refuse to 
borrow credits. This increases the market average default probability and consequently the 
interest rates. As the process continues the loan supply curve may bend backwards and 
credit rationing can emerge as a consequence. (Gertler 1988, p. 569) 
The second reason why financial intermediaries exist arises with the intermediaries’ as-
set transformation function and emphasizes the relevance of transaction cost. Following 
the example in “The role of Financial Intermediaries”, the primary function of the financial 
market is to channel funds from lenders to borrowers like firms, households, etc. Because 
of the usually small amount a lender wants to invest, a large percentage of the purchase 
price of the shares is spent on transaction costs. By specialization financial intermediaries 
have developed a minimization of information and transaction costs (Santomero 1984, 
pp. 577-580; Mishkin 2007, pp. 35-36) as well as a minimization of interest rates. 
The technological progress in recent years did not stop at payment systems. Due to 
developments like internet, electronic payment, electronic money or smart card the focus 
on transaction costs and asymmetric information is not anymore adequate. In a situation 
with declining transaction costs and (nearly) perfect information traditional theories of fi-
nancial intermediation predict that financial intermediation would be on the decline, how-
                                                 
13 This classification is only one possibility. Fama (1980) argues that intermediaries have two functions: 
(1) providing transactions services and (2) providing portfolio management services. (Fama 1980, pp. 44-
45) On the other hand Santomero (1984) classifies the reasons how the approaches centre upon a specific 
portion of the intermediaries’ activity. These are (1) Asset Transformation Function (2) The role of the 
intermediaries’ liability and (3) the two-sided nature of the financial firm. (Santomero 1984, pp. 577-580) 
14 Based on George Akerlof’s (1970) paper “The Market for Lemons” 
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ever, the reversed happened and financial intermediation has increased. The reason for this 
is intermediaries’ activity to distribute risk across different participants. In the context of 
trading in new markets the focus on risk sharing / risk management through diversifica-
tion contributes much to the theory of financial intermediation. (Allen/Santomero 1998, 
pp. 1482-1483; Mishkin 2007, pp. 36-37) 
2 .2 .3 .  The  Banking  F i rm  
By so far the focus lay on functional theories of financial intermediation and totally ig-
nored a microanalysis i.e. the optimization problem from the standpoint of the financial 
intermediary. In addition to their intermediary role, the bank15 can also be considered as a 
firm which sells liabilities (deposits) and buys assets (loans and securities). Viewed in this 
light banking is therefore just another industry whose equilibrium is subject to standard 
economic analysis. The first attempt to model the banking firm was done by Klein (1971). 
The banking firm attempts to maximize an objective function in terminal wealth and uses 
quantity and/or prices variables (like asset quantities and asset prices) as control variables. 
(Klein 1971, pp. 207-214) Following Santomero (1984) the general form of the problem 
can be specified as 
 )]
~
([max τ−tWVE  (1) 
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~
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where 
)(•V  ≡  the objective function, where 0/ >∂∂ +τtWV and 0²/² ≤∂∂ +τtWV  
τ+tW  ≡  the value of terminal wealth at the horizon time τ  
                                                 
15 Among the different types of financial intermediaries (Depository institutions, Contractual savings 
institutions and Investment intermediaries) it makes most sense to apply the concept on Depository insti-
tutions i.e. banks. Even if their relevance in the period from 1980 to 2005 was slightly decreasing, they 
are still the most important financial intermediary. (Mishkin 2007, p. 41) 
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kt+Π
~
 ≡  the stochastic profit per unit of capital during period kt + , where τ≤≤ k1  
iA
r~  ≡  the stochastic return from asset i 
iA  ≡  the asset category i , where ni ≤≤1  
jD
r~  ≡  the stochastic cost for deposit j  
jD  ≡  the deposit category j , where mj ≤≤1  
)(•C  ≡  the operations cost function, where 0/ ≥∂∂ iAC  and 0/ ≥∂∂ jDC  
Equation (1) is the general form of the objective function to be maximized by the 
bank. In Equation (2) the multi-period valuation problem is described. Equation (3) defines 
the profit per unit of capital invested by the owners of the firm or their management repre-
sentatives. Starting with the overall view of a banking firm’s optimization problem several 
types of models can be distinguished, depending on what they focus on. (Santomero 1984, 
pp. 580-584) As will be shown later in the context of currency competition the idea of the 
“banking firm” becomes of particular relevance, when banks are permitted to issue their 
own money. 
2.3. Central Banks 
The special characteristics of banks as financial intermediaries derive more from regu-
lations (restrictions on returns paid on deposits, reserve requirements), than from any role 
played by banks with respect to money. (Fama 1980, p. 40) Because these regulations often 
are imposed by central banks it is beneficial to examine the nature of such a central institu-
tion, and, due to its functions, to question whether governmental intervention is obligatory 
for its creation or not.  
2 .3 .1 .  Rol e  o f  C en t ra l  Banks 16 
The most important factor which transforms a certain institution into a central bank is 
the legal monopoly of currency issue i.e. a certain bank is permitted to print the money. It 
was such a situation of uncontrolled currency issue, which inspired Hayek to his idea of 
currency competition. He does not reject the idea of central banking itself, but the concept 
of a government-sponsored central bank. In such an institution government would take 
                                                 
16 The description follows in general White (1999, pp. 70-80), other sources will be marked. 
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advantage of several central bank’s functions and thus interfere with the economic process. 
(Hayek 2007 pp. 100-102) In Hayek’s view, only money which is exposed to the process of 
competition can be good money, otherwise the government has incentives to use the print-
ing press and create inflation.17 
The functions of central banking could be distinguished into following major roles: (1) 
serving as a bankers’ bank (2) having a monopoly of note issue (3) acting as a lender of last 
resort (4) regulation commercial banks and (5) conducting monetary policy) 
To be a bankers’ bank is the minimal sense which qualifies an institution as a central 
bank. Central banks would be banks whose liabilities are held by commercial banks as part 
of their reserves. This function is not a prerogative of a government-sponsored institution, 
but also evolves in an environment of currency competition. Because of Clearing Arrange-
ments between different issuing banks, an interbank clearinghouse system would emerge. 
Such systems are a multilateral result of the economization of transactions costs.18 
Together with the operation of the discount window, the function as a lender of the 
last resort forms the discount policy in today’s central banking (Mishkin 2007, 
pp. 380-381). The main difference between both is that the operation of the discount win-
dow would also work between single banks, whereas the need for a last resort comes into 
existence, when banks are not willing to lend money to each other any more. In a fractional 
banking system this could cause liquidity shortages and consequently “bank runs”. What 
constitutes a central bank is the ability of a certain bank to act as a lender of the last resort 
and again, it is not written down anywhere that such an institution should be government-
sponsored. 
The legal monopoly of currency issue contributes importantly to turning the institu-
tion possessing it into a central bank. It originates from the era of coinage, when the proc-
ess of standardization19 needed credibility which only the governments could provide. 
                                                 
17 The public choice approach assumes an opportunistic behaviour of the central banks i.e. central banks 
orient their policy towards election dates. There is some evidence that before elections central banks try to 
reduce unemployment through a less restrictive monetary policy. (see notes to professor Weigel’s lecture 
“Ein wenig Politische Ökonomie der Zentralbanken”) 
18 This assumption can be verified by historical cases in the United States during the period of free bank-
ing. 
19 In the sense of a signal of the quantity and purity of the metal 
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(Ritter 1995, p. 134) So the monopoly of note issue is not a natural monopoly, but rather a 
product of legislation. 
As mentioned above regulations of commercial banks are often imposed by central 
banks, but the regulation of the banking industry need not come from an external source. 
Like the case of the lender of the last resort role, each member bank desires to eliminate 
the danger of others defaulting and would therefore agree on certain regulations. Moreover 
a member-controlled institution would introduce regulations which the banks themselves 
consider beneficial. 
The last function of an official central bank is the conduction of (an official) mone-
tary policy. This policy is aimed at providing (1) price stability (2) high employment (3) 
economic growth (4) stability of financial markets (5) interest rate stability and (6) foreign 
exchange market stability. Together with the monopoly of currency issue both functions 
are the only one which can be played by a government-sponsored institution. Among the 
functions of central banking this one is the most controversial one, because it assumes that 
central bank pursues the government’s macroeconomic goals which can, when improperly 
defined, disturb the economic process and harm the economy. As governments seek to 
gain support from more voters they would regularly have incentives to implement political 
inspired policies (promoting high employment) than economic inspired ones (price stabil-
ity). (Hayek 2007, p.  103) 
2 .3 .2 .  Estab l i s hmen t  o f  Cen t ra l  Banks  
Central banks are not a natural development of the banking system, in the sense that 
they are not a spontaneous and evolutionary result arising from the market. Contrary, they 
are imposed from outside the market as a result of governmental action (Soto 1995; 
pp. 25-28) Their establishment follows not a unique path, but rather the above described 
functions form the framework under which it is possible to understand the origins. In the 
United States the Federal Reserve System was created after the bank panic of 1907, which 
was the most severe one in the history of nationwide bank panics. Widespread failures and 
substantial losses to depositors convinced the public to establish an institution which 
should act as lender of the last resort to prevent future panics. (Mishkin 2007, p. 312) In a 
system with competing financial intermediaries, banks always bear the risk of default, which 
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then, through a process aggravated by contagion, puts the functioning of the monetary 
system at risk. Therefore the role as lender of the last resort is often regarded as the main 
cause of the establishment of central banks. (Goodhart 1987, pp. 75-76) In most of the 
industrial countries the development of central banks additionally goes along with the mo-
nopoly of currency issue. (Hayek 2007, pp. 28-30) The existence of central banks around 
the world did not materialize by accident, but rather there are political and historical rea-
sons why they run the bankers’ bank, monopolize the production of currency and reserve 
money, and regulate the provision of bank-issued money. (White 1999, p. 88) 
2 .3 .3 .  Mone ta r y  Po l i c y  
From the standpoint of the evolution of payment system, monetary policy is regarded 
separated from the evolution of central banks (Goodfriend 1991). This might be true in the 
sense that monetary policy did exist even before central banks come into existence, but 
fundamental is that in all times governments were involved into monetary policy 
(White 1999, p 88) and just the form of its intervention changed. In the current financial 
system monetary policy is executed through (national) central banks’20 control over money 
supply. Hence this work seeks to examine an environment of privatized money supply it 
would be helpful to look first into an environment where a central instance has the power 
over money supply. 
Concerning the central bank’s role of conducting monetary policy a central discussion 
arises from the question whether central banks have a hierarchical or a dual mandate. 
Given the above mentioned targets of monetary policy, the hierarchical mandate sets the 
goal of price stability as the main objective for central banks. Only as long this goal is 
achieved other goals, like employment or economic growth can be pursued. Contrary, 
when the central bank is charged with a dual mandate it tries to achieve two co-equal objec-
tives, respectively price stability and maximum employment. (Mishkin 2007, p. 397) To put 
it in other words: Should there be a distinction between the monetary and fiscal activities of 
the government? (Schwartz/Todd 2008 p. 167) 
The supporters of the dual mandate claim that the monetary policy does not only af-
fect prices, but also output, employment and other important aspects of non-financial ac-
                                                 
20 Considered as a government agent 
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tivity. If now any objectives are left completely unspecified, the policy makers would not 
take them into account and the central bank could depress economic activity by making the 
prices of other goods decline whenever food and energy prices experience large increases. 
Therefore the hierarchical mandate is in their view a kind of unspoken dual mandate. More 
explicit articulation of ends would clearly facilitate greater accountability and reduce uncer-
tainty. (Friedman 2008) 
By contrast the advocates of the hierarchical mandate start their thoughts at the only 
thing central banks can do: the creation and destruction of the monetary base through the 
instruments that are feasible to them.21 With this starting point one can proceed to list the 
lessons that central banks have learned about what can be done. First of all, the knowledge 
of current and prospective developments of the economy is incomplete and they are not 
able to know what they would need to know to operate a perfect, an economy’s large-scale 
model of all time. Pursuing more than one mandate would not produce the desired out-
come. An expansionist policy, implemented to boost employment and economic growth, 
will only add zeros to the money supply and prices. A central bank’s policy may affect real 
variables like productivity, economic growth and employment, but does not control them. 
Any policy action directed to do so would only contribute to unnecessary volatility of these 
variables. What a central bank can do is to promote price-stability in which the real vari-
ables are embedded. (Friedman 1968, p. 11, Schwartz/Todd 2008, pp. 167-180) 
2 .3 .4 .  The  Evo lu t i on  o f  Mon e ta ry  Po l i c y  Ru l e s  
Thus monetary policies are strongly linked to money supply, this poses the question 
up, what is the optimal behaviour of the money issuing institution. There are three basic 
schools of thought on the question of the monetary constitution: (1) the discretionary 
central banking school, which favours discretion or activism (like Keynesians) (2) the 
constitutional central banking school, which advises that the central bank should follow 
a specific formula (like Monetarism), and (3) the free market money school. (White 1999, 
p. 218) The third school, which favours decentralized and competitive money supply over 
central banking, will be examined in chapter 4. Following analysis concentrates on the first 
two which competing proposals form the framework for the evolution of practical mone-
                                                 
21 That are (1) open market operations (2) discount policy and (3) reserve requirements (Mishkin 2007, 
pp. 378 - 386 
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tary policy.22 The discretionary central banking school and the constitutional central bank-
ing school have in common, that they consider the money supply as the central banks’ an-
swer to money demand. Therefore the focus lies on the question whether or to what extent 
the quantity of money demanded is affected by changes in interest rates. 
The classical quantity theory of money started with the observation 
M
YP
V
×
= , where 
P  is the price level, Y  is aggregate output (income) and M  is the total quantity of money. 
The variable V  is called velocity of money and describes the average number of times per 
year that a monetary unit is spent in buying the total amount of goods and services in the 
economy. Through rearranging one yield PY
V
M ×=
1
 and as the velocity of money was 
considered to be constant, the Classical Economists were able to provide a formula how 
the central bank should set the money supply: PYkMM ds ×== 23. In this equation the 
demand for money is purely a function of income, and interest rates have no effect on the 
demand for money. (Mishkin 2007; pp. 493-494) 
The Quantity Theory of Money was refined by Keynes who emphasized the impor-
tance of interest rates and introduced the liquidity preference theory in the demand for 
money. Due to transactions motives, precautionary motives and speculative motives, peo-
ple want to hold a certain amount of real money balances. In his liquidity preference func-
tion ),(
+−
= Yif
P
M d
 the demand for real money balances is negatively related to the interest 
rate i  and positively related to income Y . After solving the function for velocity, we yield 
                                                 
22 “Practical“ relates to the fact, that the ideas of the free market money school were never part of mone-
tary policy practice. The only historical evidence the adherents of this school derive from the Free Bank-
ing era in Scotland (1716-1845), Switzerland (1823-1850) and the United States of America (1837 – 
1863) (Boller 1992, pp. 38 – 44) 
23 This formula became generally known as the Quantity Theory of Money Demand. 
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the equation 
),( Yif
Y
V = .24 Velocity of money, and consequently the demand for money is 
not constant anymore, but instead affected by interest rates. (Miskin 2007, pp. 497-505) 
The next development in the Quantity theory of money demand was offered by Mil-
ton Friedman and his “ k  percent rule”25. His proposal contained that some monetary ag-
gregate (either 1M  or 2M ) should grow at the rate of k  percent per year where k  is con-
stant. In Friedman’s view changes in interest rates have little effects on the demand for 
money, (Mishkin 2007, p. 509) and Central banks will choose M , which has the most sta-
ble velocity V , so that nominal income, at best equal to MV , is relatively stable. Putting 
these features in a formula one can write YgPgVgMg YPVm +=+ , where g  times the 
variable denotes the growth rate of every single variable. Given the values of VgV  and 
YgY  from historical data, central banks are able to stabilize the price level i.e. 0=Pg P  
simply through growth of the monetary aggregate. The simple model was later extended by 
slightly more complicated rules but still focused on the growth of the monetary aggregate. 
(White 1999, p. 219-225) All strategies which suggest that the chosen monetary aggregate 
should be targeted to grow at a constant rate became known as monetary targeting (Mish-
kin 2007, pp. 398-399) 
As the choice of a policy rule determines the variances of output and inflation, an op-
timal rule is naturally one that minimizes a weighted sum of these variances, where the 
weights are determined by policymakers’ tastes. In this context emerge the Taylor rules 
which are policy rules for setting the interest rate r  through the equation 
π
ββ
αλ q
y
q
r +




 +
=   where y  is the gap between output and potential out (output gap), 
r  is the difference between the real interest rate and its equilibrium level, π  is the differ-
ence between inflation and its average level (inflation gap), α , β  and λ  are constants and 
q  is a function of the model’s parameters and the weights that policymakers put on infla-
                                                 
24 Starting with ),( Yif
P
M d
=  first the formula is rewritten as 
),(
1
YifM
P
d
= . Afterwards both 
sides are multiplied with Y and, as in money market equilibrium demand equals supply, Md is replaced by 
M: 
),( Yif
Y
M
YP
=
×
. The left-hand-side is nothing else than the velocity of money, so 
),( Yif
Y
V =  
25 His proposal made inroads into the economic literature as the Modern Quantity Theory of Money. 
 
  F INANC IAL  INST ITUT IONS  
 - 21 - 
tion and output variances. (Bell 1997, pp. 5-9) The Taylor rules have one special character-
istic that make them favourable to money central banks: They do not only keep inflation 
under control but also minimize business-cycle fluctuations of output around its potential 
(Romer 2006, p. 526; Mishkin 2007, p. 415) 
The last presented policy rule is the so called inflation targeting, where policies attempt 
to achieve a target level of inflation. Such inflation targets can be distinguished between (1) 
strict inflation targets and (2) inflation targets with gradual adjustment. In both cases the 
targeting will be carried out through setting of an “optimal interest rate”. While a strict 
inflation target is optimal only for extreme tastes of the policy makers (expressed through 
q ) the inflation target with partial adjustment in contrast is a better description of central 
banks’ policies in several countries. (Bell 1997, pp. 9-12) 
Two further dimensions in the discussion about monetary policy are questions dealing 
with (1) the independence of central banks and (2) the credibility of central banks. The 
first one stems from the observation that the behaviour of central banks coincides with the 
so-called political cycle. Monetary policy enables policymakers quickly (but temporarily) to 
achieve higher employment, financing the budget deficit and low interest rates. In times of 
elections politicians can exert pressure on the central bank executives to conduct a more 
expansionary policy, because its temporary consequences may affect the election result to 
the politicians’ favour. A more independent central bank could therefore pursue the price-
stability goal and is not subject to an inflationary bias (Alesina 1993 pp. 151-152, Cuckier-
man 1994 p.1437-1439) Even if this thread in the scientific literature is very absorbing the 
problem of independence is an effectual condition, which always arises when a central in-
stance issues money. Due to the deficiency in experience or data26, there is a lack of scien-
tific literature about cases concerning the independence of decentralized money issuing 
authorities. Ex ante it is not possible to predict the behaviour of the CEO of a decentral-
ized money issuing bank. On the one hand they might shun conflicts with the government, 
but on the other hand they could also have an eye on their reputation, as people will prefer 
to use a more trustworthy currency. The dimension of CEO’s reputation is closely related 
to the problem of credibility. Contrary to the independence problem credibility is not an 
                                                 
26In the time when free banking took place in the United States, Scotland, Switzerland and Canada data 
collecting was not that developed like today. 
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effectual condition of a central instance, but a necessary one.27 Although the discussion 
about this dimension might be of interest for the topic of currency competition28, a detailed 
examination would go beyond the scope of the work. 
 
                                                 
27 The ability to issue money does not assume credibility. 
28 What makes the credibility of a central instance issuing money, like central bank, different from that of 
a decentralized bank, like a commercial bank? 
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3.  INFLATION  
 
“All Inflation is so very dangerous precisely because 
many people, including many economists, regard a 
mild inflation as harmless and even beneficial.” 
F. A. Hayek 
 
he reason why the previous chapter paid so much attention on central banks and 
monetary policy lies in the fact that controlled monetary policy is often the main 
source of high inflation over extended periods. These inflation rates appear in 
many cases to be higher than is social optimal (Romer 2006, p. 496) and, due uncertainty 
and difficulties in planning for the future, lower economic growth. (Boller 1992, pp. 5-17) 
Understanding inflation is also central for the issue of currency competition, because it was 
also the idea of promoting price-stability which inspired Hayek to his proposal. (Hayek 
2007, pp. 48-51) 
3.1. Definition of Inflation and how it emerges 
Inflation is a permanent increase in the average price of goods and services in terms of 
money. Keynes’ liquidity preference theory ),( Yif
P
M
= 29 offers a good starting point to a 
better understanding of inflation. By rearranging the formula to 
),( Yif
M
P = one will get a 
simple model how inflation can emerge: It could be the result of increases in the money 
supply, increases in interest rates, decreases in output and decreases in money demand for a 
given i  and Y . Among these factors money growth plays the most important role, because 
money growth varies more than other determinants of inflation. Some enhancements of 
                                                 
29As in money market equilibrium demand equals supply, money demand 
dM  was already replaced by 
the monetary aggregate M . All other variables have again the same denotation: P is the price level, i  is 
the interest rate and Y  is real income. 
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the simple model were achieved by incorporating (1) assumptions about the interest rate, 
like the Fisher identity30 and the expectations theory of the term structure31, (2) the intro-
duction of the time inconsistency problem32, (3) the creation of interest-rate rules, like the 
Taylor rules, or (4) analysis of the government’s need for seignorage. (White 1999, 
pp. 163-164; Romer 2006, pp. 496-547)  
3.2. Costs of Inflation 
The reason why so many authors dedicated their works to the analysis of linkages be-
tween monetary policy and inflation is the assumption that inflation is costly. However, 
apart from the models’ predictions, inflation’s costs are not well understood and yet 
economists have difficulty in identifying substantial costs of inflation. Therefore it makes 
more sense to follow the classification proposed by Romer (2006) than the proposal of 
Boller (1992)33. The costs of inflation could be divided into (1) easily identifiable ones, (2) 
other costs of steady inflation and (3) cost of variable inflation 
3 .2 .1 .  Eas i l y  i d en t i f i ab l e  c o s t s  
The most obvious costs that occur in the presence of inflation are the shoe leather 
costs. Through the increased gap between the rates of return on money and on other as-
sets, people will reduce their holdings of high powered money. They will try to deposit cash 
inflows in their bank accounts as soon as possible and make therefore smaller and more 
frequent conversions of other assets into currency. Even if they are small for almost all 
                                                 
30 The Fisher identity defines the real interest rate r  as the difference between the nominal interest rate 
i and expected inflation eπ  i.e. eir π−≡ or equivalently eri π+≡  
31 This Theory deals with the relationship among interest rates over different horizons. It suggests that the 
expectations concerning future short-term rates of bonds (plus the term premium to holding a long-term 
bond) are equal: nt
n
ntt
n
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32 The simple time inconsistency problem could be described as follows: Through the control of money 
growth, the policymaker chooses inflation directly, subject to the constraint that inflation and output are 
related by the aggregate supply curve. The policymakers choice of π  is a function of the expected infla-
tion )*(* yy
a
be −+= ππ . In this formula for “optimal inflation rate”, the policymaker’s discretion 
does increase inflation without affecting output. However, the public forms its expectations accordingly 
to what the policymaker announces and therefore the policymaker has an incentive to produce in the next 
period an inflation that is higher than *π . 
33 Boller (1992) distinguishes between (1) the cost and consequences of anticipated inflation and (2) the 
cost and consequences of inflation uncertainty, but his classification coincide throughout most with that 
one of Romer (2006) if his first two distinctions would be combined. 
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inflation rates, because of opportunity costs they represent a cost of inflation. (Boller 1992, 
p. 9-10; Romer 2006). 
Another easily identifiable cost of inflation arises due to the costs of changing nominal 
prices and wages. If price adjustments were costless, one would expect no problems from a 
rising price level. But in reality exist positive transaction and information costs and prices 
are adjusted only when costs of not changing prices are higher than the so-called menu 
costs. Prices lose their main function as a signal of scarcity of a specific good at any point 
of time. As a consequence people and companies have to put more efforts to gather infor-
mation and misallocation of resources will happen. (Boller 1992, p. 8, p.15; Romer 2006, p. 
548) 
Inflation also can affect incentives for investment and saving, because it distorts the 
tax system. In most countries incomes and deductions are computed in nominal terms. If 
the tax system of a country is inflexible i.e. thresholds of tax brackets in a progressive in-
come-tax system are not adjusted, then economic agents have to bear a higher tax burden. 
Inflation can therefore significantly alter the relative attractiveness of different kinds of 
investment, and represents a redistribution of resources from private households to the 
public sector. Contrary to the shoe leather and the menu costs, the cost of inflation 
through tax distortion or fiscal drag may be large. (Boller 1992, pp. 11-12; Romer 2006, 
p. 548) 
3 .2 .2 .  Oth e r  c o s t s  o f  s t ead y  i n f l a t i on  
The first type of costs of steady inflation is closely linked to the menu costs and the 
misallocation of resources. A steady inflation causes variations in relative prices as different 
firms adjust their prices at different times. Such relative-price variability disrupts markets 
as it makes long-term relationship between different parties harder. (Romer 2006, p. 549) 
Another problem appears in the households’ and firms’ perceptions. The fact that a 
3 % inflation rate will triple the price level within 40 years is not totally recognized by the 
economic agents. Rather, they tend to do their financial planning in nominal terms, which 
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causes systematically errors in saving for their retirement, in assessing the real burdens of 
mortgages, or in making long-term investment.34 (Romer 2006, p. 549) 
The next cost of steady inflation refers more to a psychological phenomenon than 
to “real” costs of inflation. As people relate their economic environment in terms of dollar, 
they have the behaviour to dislike it. Even if the changes in price level have no conse-
quences for their real income, they may find large changes in dollar prices and wages dis-
turbing. They intrinsically dislike inflation and often blame the policy maker for it.35 (Ro-
mer 2006, pp. 449-450) 
The last cost of steady inflation is not covered in Romer (2006) and deals with the 
welfare losses. The welfare costs of inflation can be distinguished into (1) short-run wel-
fare costs and (2) long run welfare costs. Whereas the short run costs are partly unantici-
pated, the long run costs become fully anticipated as agents adjust their expectations about 
inflation. The most common example of this adjustment process is that agents want to 
hold less real money balances, because inflation acts as an implicit tax on money balances. 
The consumer substitutes away from cash until the marginal costs of avoiding inflation 
(like the use of credits) are equal to the marginal inflation rate tax on cash use. (Gilman 
1993, pp. 97-98) The welfare cost of inflation is a controversial concept in economic theory 
and works through income transfers and the net loss of valuable services which society has 
to bear. (Tatom 1976, p. 9) 
3 .2 .3 .  Cos t s  o f  va r i ab l e  i n f l a t i on 36 
This point is probably the most important one because greater inflation variability in-
creases uncertainty and lowers welfare. A greater uncertainty about inflation impedes firms 
and individuals to undertake long-term investment (Romer 2006, pp. 550-551) but also has 
a negative impact on capital accumulation as lenders are not willing to lend their money 
anymore. The adjacent figure makes the cost of variable inflation more clear: The solid line, 
                                                 
34 A controversial feature of this argument is the fact that economic agents have myopia concerning the 
evolution of the future inflation rate otherwise they would not miscalculate their financial planning. 
35 The most popular case was the successful 1992 presidential campaign of Bill Clinton against Georg H. 
W. Bush. Due to foreign policy developments such as the end of the Cold Ward and the Persian Gulf 
War, Bush was considered unbeatable. In the campaign Clinton’s strategist came up with the slogan 
“(It’s) the economy, stupid” to point out, that Bush was not able fix the economy during the recession at 
that time. The slogan showed its effect and Bush plummeted from 90 % approval to 69 % disapproval 
with his job performance. 
36 variable in the sense, that future pace cannot be extrapolated 
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the dotted line and the dashed line represent possible future range of inflation-rate devel-
opments. The first one describes a situation where economic agents expect the inflation 
rate to remain on a low level. The second one is a case with low uncertainty and the last 
one is the case of high uncertainty about the future policy of monetary authorities. The 
higher the uncertainty about the future path of the inflation rate gets, the riskier it becomes 
for market participants to commit themselves by long-term contracts. (Boller 1992, p.12-
14) 
 
Figure 2: The cost of variable inflation 
To avoid inflation, or to put it in another way to respond to real disturbances, the lit-
erature recommends an optimal monetary policy of the central bank. For example, a dura-
ble monetary policy rule (like the Taylor rules or the inflation targeting) will help to reduce 
inflation uncertainty and, reduce the resource costs devoted to misallocation (White 1999, 
p. 226; Woodford 2001, p. 236). A discussion about an alternative approach to avoid infla-
tion and to reduce uncertainty was triggered by Hayek in his book “Denationalisation of 
money”, in which he proposed the possibility of privately issued money. 
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4.  CURRENCY COMPETITION  
 
“The past instability of the market economy is the 
consequence of the exclusion of the most important 
regulator of the market mechanism, money, from itself 
being regulated by the market process.” 
F. A. Hayek 
 
ssential efforts have been spent in the previous chapters to sketch the monetary 
framework in which a possible competition between currencies would take 
place. This chapter now tries to examine, whether and to what extend a system 
of competing currencies is possible. The first distinction in such a system can be drawn 
between (1) competition between currencies issued by (national) central banks and (2) 
competition between privately issued currencies.37 Another possible typology is to classify 
the type of money into (1) (commodity) backed money and (2) unbacked (fiat) money. As 
both classifications do not exclude each other it is possible to display them in following 
raster: 
  Type of money 
  backed/commodity unbacked/fiat 
Central bank 1 2 
Is
su
in
g
 
 in
st
an
ce
 
Commercial bank 3 4 
Table 1: Typology of currency competition 
                                                 
37 According to Hayek (2001) the first one is only a stage on the way to privately  
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Field (1) describes a system in which a (national) central bank issues money that is re-
deemable in gold, silver or any other commodity. A historical example would be the time 
span when the monopoly of currency issue was nationalized until the end of the gold stan-
dard with the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. This work will refer to that type of 
competition as a system of Commodity Standard (Competition). 
The next field (2) is system in which unredeemable national currencies compete with 
each other. This may be a good approximation for the current financial system, where at 
the moment three dominant currencies (Dollar, Euro & Yen) exist and a fourth (Renminbi 
or Yuan) seems to be emerging. The competition in this type is limited to some few inter-
national currencies; therefore the work will follow Hartmann (1998) and denote this system 
as International Currency Competition. 
Field (3) coincides partially with field (1) as all issued money is redeemable into a cer-
tain commodity, but the difference lies in the agent that issues the currency. In this system 
commercial banks are allowed to bring their own money into circulation. (Selgin/White 
1994 p. 1721) Like the two examples above also this field has a real counterpart in History. 
The already often mentioned era of Free Banking in the United States of America and 
Scotland is a typical example for this kind of competition, but also Switzerland, France, 
Australia, Italy, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden witnessed periods of Free Banking 
(Mafi 2003, p. 480). Following the existing literature this work refers to that type as Free 
Banking (Competition). 
Contrary to all other types of competition the last field (4) was, up until now, never 
brought into existence and represents the most challenging type to examine. In this envi-
ronment commercial banks can introduce their own money, which is not (or only partial) 
redeemable into any commodity. Writing his book “Denationalisation of Money” Hayek 
had this type of currency competition in mind, and the work will use the expression Pri-
vate Currency Competition for it. 
4.1. Commodity Standard Competition 
A monetary standard can be defined as a fixed relation between a currency and a 
commodity (or group of commodities) in physical form or of titles to designated physical 
quantities of a commodity (or group of commodities). A standard can be divided into (1) a 
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strict commodity standard, and (2) a partial commodity standard. In the first case, 
currency represents a real claim on the commodity. Both, the supply of currency and the 
prices of other goods in terms of the currency commodity, are determined entirely by mar-
ket forces. The demand for monetary commodity stock and non-monetary commodity 
flow and the supply of the commodity are the crucial determinants. The second type arises, 
when total output grows, but the velocity of circulation is constant. In such a situation the 
commodity will be “economized” through the use of fractional reserves for mediums of 
circulation or the creation of additional currency which is only partially redeemable. 
(Friedman 1951, pp. 203-213) The further analysis here will deal with the first type, because 
a partial commodity standard coincides mainly with the current system and will be exam-
ined in the chapter about International Currency Competition. 
4 .1 .1 .  A s imp l e  mod e l  o f  a  S t r i c t  Commod i t y  S tanda rd 38 
The analysis assumes a closed economy in which a monopolistic central bank issues 
one currency which is redeemable into a commodity at a fixed price. Private Banks provide 
the public with various forms of deposits and hold commodity reserves39 to redeem these 
deposits into the commodity on demand. The productive resources are exogenously given 
and employed in the commodity-producing and the consumer-good industries, and the 
relative price of the commodity and consumer goods equals the rate of transformation. 
Therefore the two production functions are: 
(1.1) )( pcc =  with 0)(' <pc  and 
(1.2) )( pgg =  with 0)(' >pg  
(1.3) 
C
G
p
p
p ≡  
Where c  denotes the physical production of consumer goods, g  the physical produc-
tion of the commodity, and the relative price p  is defined as the commodity price Gp  
divided by the price of consumer goods Cp . In this model the central bank commits itself 
                                                 
38 The presented model follows the proposal of Boller (1992) 
39 The last subchapter of this section offers a discussion whether banks should hold 100 % reserves or 
only a fraction of these deposits. 
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to buy and sell the commodity at the fixed price Gp . The nominal stock money supplied 
SM  can be expressed as: 
(1.4) 
α
mGS GpM =  
In this equation MG  is the commodity stock used for monetary purposes and α  is the 
fraction of the circulation banknotes and deposits backed by the commodity40. On the 
other hand money demand DM  is given by following equation: 
(1.5) 
)1( π+
=
y
M D  with 
(1.6) )/( ppE &=π  and 
(1.7) )()( pgppcpy 9MGC +=  with )( pg 9M′  
y  is called the transaction variable and )1( π+ is the opportunity cost of holding 
money, π  the expected inflation rate and 9Mg  the non-monetary flow demand for the 
commodity. By combining (1.4) and (1.5), the equilibrium of the money market is given by 
(1.8) 1−=
MGGp
y
απ  
Changes in the commodity stock MG
&  used for monetary purposes are defined as 
(1.9)  M9MM GpgpgG δ−−= )()(&  
The formula predicts that changes in MG  are fuelled by new production of the com-
modity )(pg , minus non-monetary uses of the commodity )( pg 9M  and, due to deprecia-
                                                 
40 In the case of strict commodity standard α  is assumed to be equal to 1 
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tion, minus losses on the existing monetary commodity stock MGδ . The price-level dynam-
ics are given through41 
(1.10) p
G
ppgpc
p
M
9M −
+
=
)()(
α&  
The qualitative analysis via phase-diagram shows following pattern42 
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium path in a phase diagram 
Given the direction of the arrows, the equilibrium path is a cycle, either leading away 
from or leading to the equilibrium point E . In this model stability depends on the relative 
slopes and is ensured in all cases when the absolute slope of 0=MG& -curve must be 
smaller than the absolute slope of the 0=Mp& -curve. The model has a unique stable equi-
                                                 
41 Putting the assumption of perfect foresight 
p
p&
=π  into (1.8) gives 
pp
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y
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p
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1 . Afterwards y  and p are substituted by the definitions 
from (1.3) and (1.7) which yields 
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42 The derivation of the demarcation curves and their slopes can be found in the Appendix A 
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librium at point E  whenever the condition 00 ==
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
p
M
MG
M
p
G
p
G
&  is satisfied. One of 
the models features is, that in equilibrium the monetary commodity stock and the relative 
price of the commodity are simultaneously determined and the stylized economy exhibits 
stability. 
As we have seen above, by an exogenous fixing of the price of a commodity43 market 
forces provide a stable price level and, thus, lowers the risk of long term contracts. The big 
advantage of a commodity standard is its ability to adjust the money supply automatically, 
by setting price signals to commodity producers. Nevertheless, this model also identifies 
two possible main sources of price-level fluctuations: (1) changes in the reserve ratio, and 
(2) changes in the production functions of the commodity and consumer goods. Whereas 
the first one is subject to central bank decision, the second one depends on the production 
of the commodity. Changes in its production44 relative to the production function of con-
sumer goods leads to changes in the supply of the commodity and additionally to changes 
in the price level. (Boller 1992, 32-33, Friedman 1951, pp. 204-205) 
How would it look like to implement a system of competition between national com-
modity standard. If central banks have the same commodity, the exchange rate risk is al-
most eliminated. The currency represents a claim on a certain amount of the same com-
modity and the exchange rate will be defined through the ratios of these claims. The most 
striking problem is that, due to the scarcity of natural resources, it is not possible that all 
currencies are backed by the same commodity. Different commodity standard (mainly me-
tallic minerals like gold, silver or copper) would emerge and their exchange rate risk is de-
termined through the markets of the different commodities. Another idea is to define the 
currency as an international standardized market basket of commodities, which contains so 
many units of commodity X , so many units of commodity Y , etc. The only requirement 
of such commodities is their physical and economic suitability for storage. (Friedman 1951, 
p 213-215) Adopting the same standardized commodity bundle eliminates again the ex-
change rate risk and different currencies, when they represent also the same nominal claim 
                                                 
43 Traditionally gold or silver 
44 Triggered by technological progress; One example is the invention of the cyanide process for extraction 
pure gold from ore; (White 1999 p. 38) 
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on the commodity bundle, would be perfect substitutes.45 The only costs of exchange will 
emerge along the transportation costs of the commodity bundles and subsequently lead to 
bilateral agreements and further to multilateral clearing arrangements (Goodfriend 1991, p. 
14). A certain bank in country Y  will collect notes issued in country X  and vice versa, a 
certain bank in country X  will collect notes issued in country Y . In a first step both will 
exchange the notes into the domestic currency at their central banks. Each central bank 
would want to redeem the collected notes, rather than to pay them back out again or to 
accumulate them indefinitely. Thus, to minimize the cost of unilateral or irregular redemp-
tion46, a regular meeting for bilateral redemption will emerge, where X -notes are traded 
for Y -notes. The gains from unilateral to bilateral note-exchange are further extended and 
will end in the constitution of a multi-lateral exchange system or international clearing-
house system. (Selgin 1987, p. 453-454) This international clearinghouse system would be a 
spontaneous institution47 and would link all reputable central banks and, hence, will func-
tion as an international control agency that domestic banks will meet the requirements of 
the standardized commodity bundle, especially the redeem ability of their currencies. Even 
if these considerations are theoretically, there is some historical evidence like the Suffolk 
bank clearing system during the Free Banking era in the United States, that such an evolu-
tion will take place. (White 1999, pp. 16-19)  
It is essential to note, that the described system would only work, when central banks 
hold 100 % reserves. The reason why they have to hold 100 % of the commodity bundle is 
quite obvious: When the issued currency is not entirely redeemable the currency system will 
be a partial commodity standard and end in the issue of fiat money (Friedman 1951, p. 
211). How currency competition in a partial commodity standard system with fiat money 
works, will be examined in the following chapter.  
4.2. International Currency Competition 
In the period after World War II the world witnessed an intensification of relation-
ships regarding political, economic and sociologic spheres. Especially in the economic field 
                                                 
45 When two currencies represent 1/8 of a standardized commodity bundle, there is no reason to reject one 
currency as a media of exchange. 
46 Costs of transport and time 
47 Selgin/White argued that in a competive environment clearinghouses will always  emerge  and meet the 
functions of certification, regulation and lender of the last resort (Selgin/White 1994, pp. 1732-1733) 
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that evolution leads to a broader international view in which traditional concepts seemed 
not be adequate any more. A result of this “internationalization” was the advent of new 
phenomena like international currencies. An international currency fulfils one or several of 
the classical money functions48 expended by the claim that also non-nationals or non-
residents of the issuing country, whether they be private or public agents, can take advan-
tage of these functions. In this context international currency competition describes the 
process, to what extend several national currencies are employed by non-residents. In the 
decades after World War II the dollar was the dominant international currency. It was the 
preferred Unit of Account in most of the international markets and the driving force be-
hind political and/or economic leadership, (Hartmann 1998, p. 1) but in the last decade its 
position was eroded by the introduction of a single European Currency – the Euro. Hence, 
it makes sense to consider the possibility of competing international currencies and in 
which manner this can happen. 
International Currency Competition among foreign central banks can be restricted in 
several ways: (1) economic agents can be enforced to use the currency issued by the domes-
tic central bank as a Unit of Account (2) it might be prohibited by law to denote contracts 
in foreign currencies (3) the holding of foreign currencies by residents can be restricted, 
and (4) governments do not accept any other currency than the one issued by the domestic 
central bank. (Vaubel 1986 p. 927) First of all, these restrictions have to be removed to 
guarantee a choice in currency and an upcoming evolution of international money. Only 
when an individual agent or institution residing in a country other than that of this currency 
is permitted to accept or to use it as a Unit of Account, a Medium of Exchange or a Store 
of Value the internationalization of a currency can start. The table below shows, that during 
the process of internationalization also the traditional functions of money are subject to 
changes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 See chapter 2 
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Money Function Private use Official Use 
(1) Medium of Exchange Vehicle currency 
(i) in goods exchange: 
- foreign trade vehicle 
- domestic trade vehicle 
(ii) in currency exchange: 
- forex vehicle 
Intervention currency 
(2) Unit of account Quotation currency Pegging currency 
(3) Store of value Investment currency Reserve currency 
Table 2: Money functions of an international currency 
In the system of competing international currencies central banks still have a crucial 
role. They can try to influence their country’s exchange rates by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market so that their currency will serve as an intervention currency. Because 
central banks are only able to intervene in those currencies in which they hold some re-
serves, currency will work additionally as a reserve currency. Finally, when the exchange 
rate to another currency is fixed at some level, currency performs as a pegging currency49. 
The functions of private use of an international currency coincide mainly with the func-
tions of money already described in Chapter 2. The main difference occurs when an inter-
national currency function as a vehicle currency. In this situation the currency is the ac-
cepted Medium of Exchange in domestic or foreign trading. Similar it works on the foreign 
exchange (forex) market: If a currency is primarily used as the Medium of Exchange into 
other currencies, then the currency serves as a forex vehicle. Quotation currency is a cur-
rency in which unit prices of goods or assets are expressed when it (the currency) is differ-
ent from the currency of the respective supplier of the goods. To finish the private use 
functions, an investment currency is a currency in which asset contracts are settled. 
(Hartmann 1994, pp. 14-19). 
                                                 
49 “Pegging currencies are those currencies against which some country’s exchange rate has to be main-
tained at some fixed level (or within some interval) as specified in an exchange rate arrangement” (Hart-
mann 1994, p. 15) 
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International currency competition would affect the inflation in several ways, because 
currencies are assets to be held, and their demand depends on the price of holding them. 
The higher the expected inflation rate, the larger will be the yield foregone by holding cur-
rencies which bear no interest. Thereby, competition among central banks reduces inflation 
in at least three ways: (1) Through the exit effect the world demand for currencies shifts 
from the currencies that are expected to depreciate and to be risky to currencies that are 
expected to appreciate and to be more stable. (2) The voice effect describes a situation in 
which the public opinion blames the policy maker for high inflation rates. Often the effect 
is triggered, when countries with higher inflation are impressed by the example of countries 
with low inflation.50 (3) Finally, the acceleration affect occurs in a situation, where an in-
flationary monetary impulse in one country affects the price level faster than a simultane-
ous monetary expansion of equal size that is common to all countries. (Vaubel 1986, pp. 
928-929).  
Mafi (2003) showed empirically, that the index of freedom to use alternative currencies 
is negative51 related to the level of inflation. (Mafi 2003, p. 487) Thus, a system of compet-
ing international currencies would be a benefit for private money holders whereas for cen-
tral banks it would be a challenging task. In their role as a competitive producer they must 
care not only about changes in total money demand but also about changes in its composi-
tion, which makes new rules for monetary expansion necessary (Vaubel 1986, p. 930). In-
ternational currency competition is just possible if one neglects money’s role as a vehicle 
currency and differences in volumes and volatilities in the numerous bilateral currency 
markets. A strictly market based emergence of the Medium of Exchange will result in the 
formation of currency unions (Alesina/Barro/Tenreyro 2002, pp. 307-311) and possibly, 
into the emergence of one single currency52 The reason lies in the minimization of transac-
tion costs, which is in the forex market determined through high (predictable) trading vol-
umes and low (predictable) trading short-term exchange rate volatilities. Hence, the curren-
cies of countries, which maintain a dominant role in international trade and investment, will 
be adapted as a general accepted Medium of Exchange and only shocks hitting the interna-
tional monetary system can trigger a shift from one dominant international currency to 
                                                 
50 For the exit and voice effect Vaubel follows the terminology of Hirschman, who introduced them in his 
book “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” (1970) 
51 And significant at the 5 % level 
52 See subchapter „Evolution of money“ 
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another. (Hartmann 1998, pp. 40-66) Additionally, the abandonment of the national cur-
rency implies the loss of national monetary policy. When monetary policy had contributed 
to business-cycle stabilization, its loss leads to higher costs in the form of wider cyclical 
fluctuations of output. (Alesina/Barro/Tenreyro 2002, p. 309) It is more likely that interna-
tional currency competition will produce several currency unions which membership is 
determined by trade, geography and co-movements of outputs and prices. 
4.3. Free Banking Competition 
The existence of a natural monopoly does maximize the profit of the industry53, but it 
reduces the benefits to consumers. In this view, the best regulation can do, is to force the 
monopoly industry to the level of competition. As Hayek questions the existence of a 
(natural) monopoly in money issue, the question is, when competition promotes economic 
efficiency, because it delivers greater benefits to consumers; why not apply it on the issue 
of money. In a system of a strict commodity standard, there is no need for government 
action, because the supply of currency is determined by market forces. The only situation 
where government can come into play is to provide services54, or to impose regulations 
concerning the type of commodity which is used, or to standardize a commodity bundle. 
(Friedman 1951, p. 204) With such base money why not allow banks to issue currency and 
to compete for shares in the currency market. 
4 .3 .1 .  A s imp l e  mod e l  o f  F r e e  Bank ing 55 
In a system of Free Banking Competition banks act like a firm56 and face an optimiza-
tion problem which is given through the structure of its balance sheet shown in following 
table: 
 
 
                                                 
53 In the case of the “money industry”, the government benefits from the monopoly of money issue. 
54 Like certifying the quality and quantity of the currency commodity or issuing or certifying warehouse 
receipts (when the commodity is stored in a warehouse) 
55 The presented model follows Selgin/White (1994) and White (1999)  
56 See Chapter “The Banking firm” where the profit maximization function is similar to that one in this 
chapter. 
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Assets Liabilities & Equity 
Reserves R  Equity capital K   
Loans and securities L  Deposits D  
 Notes or currency-card 
balances in circulation 9  
Table 3: Simplified balance sheet of a bank 
This balance sheet imposes the constraint 
(3.1) KD9LR ++=+  
and the objective function to be maximized is the profit function, given by 
(3.2) QCDiLi DL −−−=π  
where π  denotes the expected profit, Li  the interest yield on loans and securities, Di  
the interest rate on deposits, C  the operating costs, and Q  the liquidity cost. Both interest 
rates, Li  and Di  are not choice variables but determined by the loan and deposit market. 
The operating costs are a continuous function of each of the balance sheet items: 
(3.3) ),,,( D9LRf  where 0>RC , 0>LC , 0>9C , 0>DC  
In this model the liquidity cost Q  is the expected value of costs which a bank incurs, 
when it runs out of reserves. The function may be written as 
(3.4) dxD9XRXpQ ),|()( φ−=  
where X  is the outflow of reserves, ),|( D9Xφ  is the probability density function 
over X, conditional on N and D, and p  is the penalty cost as a percentage of realized illiq-
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uidity. The penalty cost p is always larger than 0, as long as RX −  is larger than 057. The 
static profit maximization yields a set of six equi-marginal conditions:58 
(3.5) RRLL QCCi −−=−  
The first marginal condition claims that the marginal net revenue form making loans 
or holding securities (left-hand side term) is equal to the marginal net benefit from holding 
reserves (right-hand side term). In this situation the profit-maximizing bank is indifferent 
between holding extra loans or securities and holding extra reserves of the same market 
value. 
(3.6) 99LL QCCi +=−  
A growing volume of currency outstanding will be reflected in rising marginal costs 
(right-hand side) and thus sets an economic limit to the amount of loans and securities 
expressed through the marginal net revenue from making loans or holding securities. 
(3.7) DDDLL QCiCi ++=−  
This equation can be understood intuitively: The amount of loans is limited to the ris-
ing marginal cost (interest payment, marginal operating costs and marginal liquidity costs) 
of acquiring funds via deposits. When the marginal net revenues from making loans equals 
the total marginal cost of maintaining and servicing deposits, then no more loans will be 
made. 
(3.8) 99RR QCQC +=−−  
This equation is implied by (3.5) and (3.6) and states that the bank’s marginal net bene-
fit from holding reserves is equal to the total marginal cost of maintaining currency in cir-
culation. Intuitively it imposes a restriction on the issue of currency to buy reserves, be-
cause it has to keep the currency in circulation. 
                                                 
57 The assumption that the outflow of reserves is bigger than the reserves is at the first sight somehow 
unrealistic: It is not possible to withdraw more money, than the bank has stored. But the historical case 
gives evidence for the contrary: During the free banking era in Scotland banks often were not able to meet 
people’s desire to withdraw money. Therefore banks had to break off the payment and guaranteed higher 
interest rate until the next possible withdrawal. This compensation plus the loss of reputation form the 
main parts of the penalty cost p , which occur when the outflow is higher than the reserves. 
58 The derivation of the first order conditions for profit maximization can be found in the Appendix. 
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(3.9) DDDRR QCiQC ++=−−  
Something similar says equation (3.9), which is implied by equations (3.5) and (3.7). 
Here the marginal net benefit from holding reserves is equal to the marginal cost of main-
taining deposits i.e. the profitability of acquiring reserves by attracting additional deposits is 
limited through the rising marginal costs of deposits. 
 (3.10) DDD99 QCiQC ++=+  
The last equation describes the constraint, that the marginal cost of expanding the cur-
rency circulation must equal the marginal cost of expanding the bank’s deposits. In the 
profit-maximizing equilibrium both sources are equally costly. 
The general prediction of the equi-marginal conditions is that a bank can use currency 
issue to expand its assets only if the currency59 stays in circulation. Hence, in a competitive 
environment the currency issuing bank must have customers which will hold that currency, 
rather than (1) redeem it for reserves, or (2) exchange it for deposits or the currency of 
another bank. As banks are price-takers in the loan and deposit market i.e. Li  and Di  are 
determined by the market, competition will take place along non-price dimensions. Pivotal 
factors in the choice which currency to hold are (1) the spend ability of the currency (2) 
easy redemption of the currency (3) public awareness and confidence in the currency (4) 
anti-counterfeiting measures and (5) higher physical attractiveness of the currency. 
The model above and the six equi-marginal conditions enable any particular bank i  to 
calculate the equilibrium size of its currency circulation *iP9 , where subscript P  denotes 
the public for whom the currency is an asset and superscript i  denotes the issuing bank. In 
this model there will be no over-issue by one single bank, because any over-issue will be 
reflected in the loss of reserves. The reason lies in the reflux process i.e. how the public 
respond to a currency excess of one single bank: People can (1) direct redeem the currency 
for reserves, or (2) deposit the excess currency in another bank60, or (3) deposit the excess 
                                                 
59 Which is clearly distinguishable from the currencies of other banks (Klein 1974, p. 424) 
60 In a clearinghouse system this would create adverse clearings for the over-issuer, as the recipient bank 
presents the deposited currency for redemption. 
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currency into the bank itself61. In all three cases the bank i  finds its reserves lower than it 
desires, thus the bank will have to sell securities in order to increase reserves. Also an over-
issue by a currency monopolist or by plural issuers will be corrected, but in such events by 
external drain i.e. outflow of currency reserves from all banks and not just the over-issuer. 
The last case left when all the banks in the world over-issue, only increases a representative 
bank’s probability of illiquidity. Each bank will feel its risk of running out of reserves too 
great and, thereby will contract deposits D  or Notes or currency-card balances in circula-
tion 9 . (White 1999, pp. 60-64) Similar to the commodity standard competition, also this 
model assumes implicitly the emergence of clearinghouse as a higher instance to ease the 
exchange of different currencies. Such clearinghouse associations would also solve the uni-
formity problem62 of different currencies, as membership in a certain clearinghouse system 
signals trustworthiness of the currency (Goodfriend 1991, pp. 13-14). In general, when a 
currency (1) is backed by a commodity or bundle of commodities and (2) when it is clearly 
distinguishable, it is quite probable that individuals will accept them as a Medium of Ex-
change. (Boller 1992, p. 146) The appearance of sticky behaviour and switching between 
alternative Media of Exchange will be discussed in the last chapter 
4.4.  Private Currency Competition 
Together with Free Banking this type of competition constitutes a so-called Laissez-
Faire Monetary System. Both have in common, that (1) the quantity of exchange media is 
not controlled by the government, (2) nor exists a central bank as result of government 
intervention63. There is also an absence of legal restrictions concerning (3) the entry, 
branching and exit of commercial banks and (4) the drafting of contracts between banks 
and their costumers, as well as no limitations of (5) the issued quantities, types or mix of 
debt and equity claims. Additionally, (6) interest rates are not controlled and (6) govern-
ment does not impose any deposit guarantees. (Selgin/White 1994, pp. 1718-1719, Mafi 
2003 p. 478) What makes this competition different is the competitive supply of currency 
                                                 
61 In this case the marginal equi condition (3.10) DDD99 QCiQC ++=+  is not valid, because the 
marginal cost of an additional deposit (higher cost of liquidity, higher cost of liability) is higher than the 
marginal cost of expanding currency in circulation. 
62 The uniformity problem occurs when several currencies are in circulation and, because of the uncer-
tainty about counterfeiting, a bank or a shop rejects to accept, or only accept at various discounts from 
par, a certain currency. (Selgin/White 1994) 
63 This does not exclude generally the existence of central bank. Even in a laissez-faire monetary system 
can a central bank come spontaneously into existence. 
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with parallel private fiat-type currency. Currency on a non- or partial commodity base is 
issued by private banks and can be clearly distinguished from other issued currencies. 
4 .4 .1 .  Kl e in ’ s  mod e l  o f  F ia t  Mone y 64 
The first formal treatment of the economics of private money and the introduction of 
the idea of “brand-name” currency65 was done by Benjamin Klein (1974). In his model the 
competitive supply of fiat money is examined under the assumptions of perfect and imper-
fect foresight. In the case of perfect foresight all changes in the purchasing power of a 
“brand-money j ”66 are anticipated. The profit-maximizing quantity of real balances of 
such a currency j , ( )
jP
M , is limited by the rising marginal cost of producing real balances 
of brand- j  money. The equilibrium condition is 
(4.1) jMj MCii j
=−  
where ji  denotes the nominal interest rate on bonds denominated in currency j
67, 
jM
i is the nominal interest rate paid on balances of currency j , and jMC  corresponds to 
the marginal cost of producing real balances of currency - j . The left-hand side is the 
“rental price” of currency j  i.e. the opportunity costs when consumers hold brand- j  cur-
rency balances rather than bonds.68 Because Klein distinguishes between the stock of 
money and flow of “monetary services”, the production of real money balances are not 
                                                 
64 Following Klein (1974) and White (1999) 
65 Klein introduced this definition as a description for clearly distinguishable private issued currencies or 
banknotes. Otherwise competition would drive the quality of private fiat-type monies to zero. (Klein 
1974, pp. 424). In the following analysis, the expressions currency and money assume indirectly brand-
name currency or brand-name money, even it is not explicitly written. 
66 In Klein’s argumentation the term brand-money / brand currency serves to distinguish clearly between 
several competing currencies. 
67 The whole model of Klein focuses on the institutional settings of the United States. This becomes espe-
cially obvious through the use of bonds in the model which are an institutional tribute to the United 
States. 
68 This is a simplified notation of the one Klein introduced. He formulated it as ( )
j
j
M
P
Md
dC
ri =− )(  
where Mr  is the interest payment of money, i  is the interest payment of bonds in terms of the 
thj  cur-
rency, jC  the real costs of producing monetary services, and ( )
jP
M  is the real balance of currency j . 
(Klein 1974, pp.425-426). 
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costless as the issuer has to endow the currency with the capacity to render transactions-
facilitating services. (Klein 1974, p. 424; White 1999, p. 229). Klein’s condition is very simi-
lar to the marginal equi-condition (3.7) from the previous section: 
(4.2) DDLDLDDDLL QCCiiQCiCi ++=−⇔++=−  
In this case the term ( )DL CC +  denotes the marginal cost of channelling loans into 
deposits and is equivalent to jMC . Contrary to the chapter about free banking, in this 
model do not exist any marginal liquidity cost of bank liabilities, because currency is not 
redeemable into any commodity, thus 0=DQ . Under the assumption of perfect foresight, 
the impact of any anticipated inflation would be neutralized by an explicit interest yield in 
jM
i  which compensates for future depreciation of currency j ’s purchasing power. This 
allows rearranging equation (4.1) to 
(4.3) jjM MCii
J
−=  
Combined with the Fisher effect69 the nominal interest rate on bonds denominated in 
terms of currency j  equals the real rate of interest r  and the actual (which is, due to the 
Fisher identity, equal to the anticipated) inflation rate eπ  or equivalently jgP , the change 
in the price level of currency j  
(4.4) jj gPri +=  
When the quantity of real balances of currency j , ( )
jP
M , does not change, the infla-
tion rate equals the growth rate of currency j . 
(4.5) jj gMgP =  
Substituting (4.5) into (4.4) and further into (4.3) yields following final equation for the 
situation of perfect foresight: 
                                                 
69 Remembering footnote (26) the Fisher identity defines the real interest rate r  as the difference between 
the nominal interest rate i and expected inflation eπ  i.e. eir π−≡ or equivalently eri π+≡  
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(4.6) jjM gMMCri J +−=  
The prediction of this condition is, that the explicit yield on currency j  has to equal to 
the real interest rate r , minus the marginal cost of producing real money balances jMC , 
plus full compensation for any loss of the purchasing power of currency j  triggered by 
money growth jgM . In this model only the determinacy of real balances matter and banks 
have no profit from expanding the nominal money stock i.e. no profit from hyperinflation. 
In the case of imperfect foresight the assumption of perfect predictable changes in 
prices jgP  is relaxed and consumers form expectations about these changes 
∗
jgP . To cre-
ate confidence in privately issued money, commercial banks must compensate their clients 
for this higher anticipated inflation. Equation (4.1) has now two requirements: The mar-
ginal costs of producing real balances of currency j , ( )
jP
M , have to meet (1) the cost of 
providing greater transaction services, and (2) the cost of increasing confidence. To analyse 
the behaviour of the bank one has to start with, the banks’ real income net of interest pay-
ments 
jP
ψ
, which is given by 
(4.7) 
j
Mj
j P
M
ii
P j





−= )(
ψ
 
The determination of the equilibrium amount of privately issued money can be found 
in the Appendix. More interesting is to examine the behaviour of the inflation rate, because 
this objection is the force to be reckoned with in the environment of privately issued fiat 
currency. By incorporating imperfect foresight, equation (4.7) can be rewritten as 
(4.8) 
j
j
j
j
j
Mj
j P
M
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P
M
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P
M
ii
P j
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where 
jP
ψ
 denotes the real profit, 
j
Mj
P
M
ii
j





− )(  the net real interest income, 
j
j
P
M
gM 





 the gross real revenue from issuing new money, before rebates and 
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j
j
P
M
gP 




∗  is the portion of new money that must be rebated to holders of existing j -
brand currency in order to compensate them fully for anticipated inflation. The question 
whether the profit-maximizing rate of monetary expansion is finite, or in other words, 
whether a bank has incentive to inflate its currency j , can be answered by calculating the 
first-order condition of (4.8): 
(4.9) 
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where 







 −
j
Mj
dgM
ii
d
j
 is the decrease in rental price triggered by unanticipated inflation 
and 
j
j
dgM
dgP∗
 describes peoples adjustment of current inflation expectations to current 
money growth. For simplicity the first expression will be denoted by u  and the second one 
by v . 
(4.10) ( )vu
P
M
dgM
P
d
jj
j
−+


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=




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

1
ψ
 
In his model Klein regards the term v  as constant with 10 ≤≤ v , where 1=v  repre-
sents perfect foresight and 1<v  imperfect foresight. Under imperfect foresight and 
0=u 70 the profit maximising rate of increase of money is infinite. A firm will always inflate 
its currency, because ( ) 01 >−+ vu  and thus, the marginal profit form faster monetary 
expansion is always positive. A finite monetary expansion rate will only occur when the 
marginal profit of monetary expansion equals zero: 
                                                 
70 0=u  means that the issuing firm can hold 




 −
jMj
ii  constant as jgM
 
CURRENCY  COMPET IT ION  
 - 48 -  
(4.11) ( ) 01 =−+





vu
P
M
j
 
which implies 1−= vu . As 1<v 71, this requires 10 << u . To inquire whether this 
point is a local maximum or global maximum it is necessary to remember the profit func-
tion from (4.8) and rearrange it to 
(4.10) ( )
j
jj
j
Mj
j P
M
gPgM
P
M
ii
P j





−+




−= ∗)(
ψ
 
Because ( )∗− jj gPgM  is directly proportional to jgM 72 the second part of the equa-
tion grows without limit. In order to stop growing the firm’s rental stream 
jP
ψ
, it is re-
quired that the rental price of money )(
jMj
ii −  becomes negative as money growths with-
out limit. This situation represents a local equilibrium, but when the rental price of money 
is bounded below zero, maximum profit will only occur at an infinite rate of inflation.  
                                                 
71 The case when 0=v  would describe a situation, where people do not adjust their inflation rate expec-
tations with respect to money growth. This is, more likely to be unrealistic than the assumption of perfect 
foresight. 
72 Klein assumes that expectations about inflation rates are formed by jj vgMugP +=
∗
, hence also 
expectations are proportional to the growth rate of money. 
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Figure 4: Unbounded monetary expansion 
In order to gain a better understanding, the results are presented graphically in the fig-
ure above. Equation (4.10) implies that bank j ’s real profit 
jP
ψ
, or total profit, is the sum 
of two terms: (1) the net real interest or rental income 
j
Mj
P
M
ii
j





− )(  and (2) seignor-
age ( ) 




− ∗
P
M
gPgM jj , which is the amount of real purchasing power that bank j  can 
extract from the public by printing money (Mafi 2003, p. 476). In this graph point A is a 
local equilibrium where vu −=− 1 . As u  converges to zero, beyond point B v−1  is al-
ways higher than u  and profit can be increased with unbounded monetary expansion. 
Thus, in the global equilibrium of private currency competition the so-called overissue 
problem occurs: Monetary expansion and inflation are infinitely i.e. hyperinflation. 
4 .4 .2 .  A par t i a l  v i nd i c a t i on  o f  Hay ek  
In recent years Hayek’s idea witnessed a partial theoretical and empirical vindication. 
Martin and Schreft (2006) showed that in an overlapping generation (OG) model73 and in a 
                                                 
73 Economy exists at dates nt ,...,2,1=  and at each date, a mass 1 of two-period living agents is born 
into the economy  
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search model74 exist also one equilibrium with competitively issued money. This is all the 
more notable as in earlier studies both frameworks served to prove the non-existence of a 
monetary equilibrium with competitive issuance. Indeed, there are two monetary equilib-
riums: In an environment of currency competition, money can have a value higher than the 
paper it is printed on or not, depending on the beliefs of the economic agents. To bring 
about the agent’s optimal beliefs and to achieve an efficient money supply there is a need 
for a specific cost of becoming a money issuer. To impose such costs the authors hence 
propose the introduction of a licensing agency. (Martin/Shreft 2006 pp. 27-29) May such 
an agency not be in the spirit of Hayek when it is a governmental agency, but as described 
in the analysis of central banks, a regulatory function can also emerge as a spontaneous 
result. 
By analysing the relationship between currency competition and inflation Mafi (2003) 
offered an empirical vindication of Hayek’s proposal. He examined whether competition in 
issuing currency will result in lower inflation or not. As a first step Mafi calculated the an-
nual average inflation rates during free banking eras which occurred in Australia, Canada, 
France, Italy, New-Zealand, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. Afterwards he com-
pared his results to the average annual inflation rates after the creation of each country’s 
national central bank. During the period of free banking the average inflation rate was for 
all countries significantly lower than inflation under central banking. As Hayek claimed, 
competition among currency suppliers provides consumers with choices that enhance their 
well being. (Mafi 2003, pp. 482-486) 
4.5. Fractional versus 100 % Banking 
One argument of the inherent instability of the banking system can be lead back to the 
discussion between 100 % banking and fractional banking. In the case of 100 % banking, 
the banker acts strictly as a warehouseman and no intermediation between borrowers and 
lender will take place because the banker can make loans only out of his personal wealth. 
This does not mean that no intermediation at all will take place. Only the banks’ functions 
(1) of managing demand deposits and (2) borrowing money for investment opportunities 
will be separated, and, due to these functions, two different types of institutions will 
                                                 
74 Time is discrete and denoted by nt ,...,2,1= , and the Economy is populated by a mass 1 of agents 
who live forever. 
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emerge: Accounting banks, where 100 % of the deposits are always redeemable, and in-
vestment banks, where clients abandon the right to redeem their deposits for a certain pe-
riod. This system might provide more stability, but as a consequence the cost of managing 
demand deposits will increase. On the other hand, the interest rate on deposits of invest-
ment banks will increase as well, as an investment bank has to compensate the abandoned 
right of deposit withdrawal. In the presence of fractional banking bankers lend out de-
positors’ balances, while satisfying depositors’ desire to withdraw their deposits on demand. 
This became possible because of two conditions: (1) money is fungible75 and (2) withdraw-
als are random76 (Selgin 1987, pp. 445-445) A striking feature of fractional banking is the 
multiple deposit creation. Consider a stylized balance sheet of the total banking system, 
when the required reserve ratio is 10 % 
Assets Liabilities & Equity 
Reserves R   +100 (1) 
 -90 (2) 
 + 90 (3) 
 - 81 (4) 
Deposits D  + 100 (1) 
 + 90 (3) 
Loans and securities L  + 90 (2) 
 + 81 (4) 
Equity capital K    
Table 4: Multiple deposit creation 
In the first stage (1) 100 € are deposited in a certain bank and constitute also this bank’s 
reserve. As the required reserve ratio is 10 %, the bank will not want to hold excess re-
serves and will make loans of 90 € (2). The borrower to whom the bank lent the money will 
                                                 
75 The coin and bullion which is repaid to the depositor is not identical to the coin and bullion she had 
originally brought in 
76 Compared to the large number deposits fractional reserves are sufficient to meet random withdrawal 
demands. 
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spend it77, such that the whole amount is again in circulation. For simplicity it is assumed, 
that the circulating money will be again deposited as a whole (3). Because the bank still has 
to keep only 10 % reserves, 81 € will be used for additional credits (4). This process con-
tinues until the excess reserves converge to zero. The process of multiple deposit creation 
can be written as follows: 
 (5.1) R
r
D ∆×=∆
1 78 
where D∆  denotes the change in total checkable deposits in the banking system, r  the 
required reserve ratio and R∆  the change in reserves for the banking system. (Mishkin 
2007, pp. 341-347) 
Even if the assumption of 100 % reflux from credits to deposits is somehow unrealis-
tic, fractional banking contributes to a more effective money supply than the existing stock 
of specie alone. But contrary it also does thereby create inside money. Consider following 
graph: 
                                                 
77 Why making a loan when you keep all the money in your pocket? It is more likely to assume, that the 
money will be invested 
78 The formal derivation of the equation is 
[ ][ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]nrRrRrRRD −×∆+−×∆+−×∆+×∆=∆ 1...111 2  which can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]nrrrRD −+−+−+×∆=∆ 1...111 2  Using the formula for the sum of an infinite series, it 
is possible to yield R
rr
RD ∆×⇒
−−
×∆=∆
1
)1(1
1
 
 
  CURRENCY  COMPET I T ION  
 - 53 - 
 
Figure 5: An economy with deposits as medium of exchange 
In the sketched economy all individuals nI  go to the bank B  and receive in exchange 
for their physical money m  bank’s deposits d . Subsequently, people do not use money to 
carry out their transactions but their deposit account in the bank. Deposits have become a 
Medium of Exchange which is denoted in physical money as the Unit of Account. In this 
view, deposits are nothing more than inside money, which represent a claim on physical 
currency, or to put it in other words: deposits are money which is redeemable in physical 
currency. Combined with the concept of multiple deposit creation, one can say that 
through fractional banking and technological enhancements deposits always become a type 
of privately issued fiat money. 
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5.  CONCLUSION  
 
„The question we have to consider is whether compe-
tition between the issuers of clearly distinguishable 
kinds of currency consisting of different units would 
not give us a better kind of money than we have ever 
had, far outweighing the inconvenience of encounter-
ing (but for most people not even having to handle) 
more than one kind.” 
F. A. Hayek 
 
econsidering Hayek’s proposal of currency competition was the main aim of this 
thesis and it tried to show, that his proposal is not a general but a specific idea 
how currencies can compete against each other. As presented in chapter 4, cur-
rency competition can be classified according to differences in the issuing instance and 
whether the currency is entirely or partially redeemable into a commodity or bundle of 
commodities. In doing so, four combinations are possible: (1) a central instance issues 
money which is completely backed by a commodity or bundle of commodity (Commodity 
Standard Competition), (2) a central instance issues partially redeemable money (Interna-
tional Currency Competition), (3) commercial banks issue a commodity backed money 
(Free Banking Competition), and finally (4) commercial banks bring their own fiat 
money into circulation (Private Currency Competition). The proposed denomination for 
each type does not lay claim to unique validity, but rather it tried to overcome the puzzling 
use of expressions in the existing literature. 
One of the major claims in Hayek’s idea is to avoid more government intervention than 
necessary. Therefore a great effort was spent to describe the evolution of existing institu-
tional arrangements as a spontaneous result and apply this concept on the different types 
of currency competition. The thesis gives evidence that Money, Financial Intermediation 
and also Central Banking can emerge in different ways without being imposed from out-
side. Nevertheless, government comes into play to provide and design the legal framework 
R 
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in which such processes will take place. However, its intervention should move along the 
line of regulation and not along the line of central institutional design. 
The opponents of competitively produced fiat money make their argument on the in-
flationary bias i.e. a private issuing institution has always incentives to over-issue like in the 
Model of Klein with imperfect foresight. But Martin/Schreft (2006) showed that hyperin-
flation is just one of the possible equilibriums. There exists also a monetary equilibrium, in 
which money has a higher value than the paper it is printed on, depending on the beliefs 
economic agent form. To influence this believes positively it might be necessary to intro-
duce costs of becoming a money issuer. In the authors’ view a central instance could charge 
issuing banks. From Hayek’s standpoint such an institution should be the spontaneous 
result, which is, due the thesis’ discussion on regulatory functions of central banks, quite 
probable. An empirical rejection of the inflationary bias argument was presented by Mafi 
(2003). In his paper he compared inflation rates of several countries during their experience 
with free banking to inflation rates after imposing a central bank. In his argumentation 
inflation rates were significantly lower during free banking than in the periods of central 
banking. 
Another objection against the idea of currency competition arises from the “sticky be-
haviour” of economic agents. The experiences with hyperinflation in Germany gave some 
evidence that people tend to stick with a depreciating Unit of Account for a very long time. 
Switching from one Unit of Account to another is not a costless procedure and depends 
mainly on the availability of an alternative Unit of Account that is widely used in the econ-
omy. Even if in a competitive environment exist more non-inflating numéraires, people do 
not consider only the costs of using a new numéraire (like changing the accounts), but also 
the costs of using a new means of payment.79 
Apart of the behaviour objection, there is nothing to be said against a system of free 
banking where money is issued on the base of a single commodity or a standardized bundle 
of commodities. Quite the reverse, historical and theoretical evidence suggest that such a 
system is a viable alternative monetary regime which can, up to a certain degree, provide 
price-level stability. Beside the point of political feasibility such a system is not substantially 
                                                 
79 In 2002, when the euro replaced the Schilling in Austria, people continued to calculate in Schilling as a 
numéraire for a long time. Even now, eight years later, the Schilling is still present when people make a 
rough guess on expected costs. 
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different to the current one. As shown in chapter 4, fractional banking, and in further con-
sequence multiple deposit creation, is already creation of fiat money, where deposits serve 
as  the Medium of Exchange and represent a claim on physical currency. The difference to 
a free banking or private currency system lies in the constraints: Whereas in a system of 
privately issued money banks are restricted by the costs of running out of liquidity, in the 
current system they are only constrained by legally required reserve. Due to this fact and 
additionally deposit insurance banks do not need to take costs into account. As issue of 
more money in the form of deposits is not possible, they tend to lend to riskier borrowers. 
Therefore, an environment of competitive money supply would strengthen the responsibil-
ity of banks. 
The literature on currency competition is not only an intellectual glass bead game for 
monetary theorists and historians, but also has a practical value. As mentioned in the intro-
duction it is the experience of a crisis which causes changes in current arrangements. In 
which direction such changes are towards, depends critically on the constraints of political 
feasibility and the options that have been explored. Hence, research in currency competi-
tion serves to widen the range of options and keeps them available. 
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7.  APPENDIX A:  MATHEMATICS  
 
7.1. Derivation of Demarcation curves 
The demarcation curves are given by setting 
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To evaluate the dynamic properties of the model, the deviation of (A.1) and (A.2) with 
respect to MG  is formed: 
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7.2. First-order conditions for profit maximization 
(B.1) 0=++−−⇔++=+ D9LRKKD9LR  
(B.2) QCDiLi DL −−−=π  
From (B.1) and (B.2) one can write out the Lagrangean 
(B.3) )(),,,( D9LRKQCDiLiD9LR DL ++−−+−−−= λπ  
from which the following first order conditions are derived: 
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7.3. Profit maximizing quantity of fiat money 
Starting point are banks’ real income net of interest payments, which is 
(C.1) 
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Assuming, that the cost of providing services is zero, and that the cost to find people 
who hold money is the only cost of generating confidence, it is possible to rewrite equation 
(4.7) to 
(C.2) 
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Here, the present value of banks’ income on brand name capital jβ  is a stream of re-
turns to the brand-name-capital asset value. To put it into another way, the stream of real 
income 
j
Mj
P
M
ii
j





×− )(  represents a normal rate of return. To get an intuitive under-
standing consider following extreme cases: (1) the production of confidence is costless, and 
(2) the real interest payments on money are zero. 
The first case assumes a costless production of confidence i.e. the marginal cost of 
producing real balances of brand- j  currency is zero: 0=−=
jMjj
iiMC  or 
jMj
ii = . 
The rate of return to bonds ji  is equal to jM
i , the rate of return on currency j . Because 
the marginal cost of producing real balances is zero, also the opportunity cost of holding 
money is driven to zero, and by inserting into (C.2), the amount of bank j ’s brand name 
capital jβ  is zero. 
In the second case, the nominal interest on money just equals the inflation rate i.e the 
real interest payments on money are zero: 
(C.3) jM gPi j
=  
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Remembering the Fisher equation, which defines the real interest rate r  as the differ-
ence between the nominal interest rate i and expected inflation eπ  i.e. eir π−≡ or in this 
case 
(C.4) gPri j +≡  
and substitute both, the results from (C.3) and (C.4),  into (C.2), one yields 
(C.5.) 
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In this case the amount of bank j ’s brand-name capital equals 
jP
M






,.the real bal-
ances of currency j . The stock of j -money is equal to the net wealth of its issuer. 
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8.  APPENDIX B:  ABSTRACT  
 
English 
The idea of currency competition is the most innovative and controversial proposal about 
an alteration of the current monetary system. However, the intellectual creator of this idea, 
Friedrich August Hayek, combined often an economic analysis and a more or less pam-
phlet-like description of the political process. Therefore the thesis tries to revisit Hayek’s 
idea and focus on the economic implications and effects. The first part of the thesis exam-
ines the current financial system and stresses the relevance of its institutions money, finan-
cial intermediation and central banking. The next part is dedicated to a brief examination 
on inflation whose avoidance forms the starting point in Hayek’s considerations. The main 
part develops a typology of currency competition and analyses their prospects in the cur-
rent financial system. The thesis closes with perspectives on a possible future of monetary 
policy with currency competition which is a viable alternative. 
Deutsch 
Die Idee von Währungswettbewerb ist der innovativste und zugleich umstrittenste Vor-
schlag, wie das bestehende Finanzsystem verändert werden kann. Jedoch hat der geistige 
Vater dieser Idee, Friedrich August Hayek, sehr oft eine ökonomische Analyse mit einer 
mehr oder weniger pamphletartigen Beschreibung des politischen Systems verbunden. Die-
se Arbeit versucht daher Hayeks Idee zu überdenken und auf die ökonomische Bedeutung 
und Auswirkungen einzugehen. Der erste Teil der Diplomarbeit untersucht das aktuelle 
Finanzsystem und betont dabei die Bedeutung der Institutionen Geld, Finanzintermediäre 
und Zentralbanken. Der nächste Teil ist einer kurzen Untersuchung der Inflation gewid-
met, deren Vermeidung den Ausgangspunkt von Hayeks Überlegungen darstellt. Der 
Hauptteil entwickelt eine Typologie des Währungswettbewerbes und analysiert deren Aus-
sichten im aktuellen Finanzsystem. Die Arbeit schließt mit den Perspektiven einer mögli-
chen Geldpolitik mit Währungswettbewerb als realisierbare Alternative.
  
 
 
 
 - 68 - 
 
9.  APPENDIX C:  CURRICULUM V ITAE  
 
Personal Information 
Name: Peter 
Surname: SCHNEIDER 
Date of Birth: 02/17/1985 
Place of Birth: Friesach (Carinthia) 
Education 
October 2005 – August 2010 Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Universität Wien, Austria 
October 2008 – June 2009 Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales 
(Erasmus exchange) 
Universidad de Alicante, Spain 
September 1999 – June 2004 Commercial academy in Althofen (Carinthia) 
terminated with highest distinctions (GPA: 1,3) 
A-levels (in writing): German, English, Business Stud-
ies and Bookkeeping 
A-levels (oral): Italian, Marketing, History 
Language Skills 
German mother tongue 
English first foreign language 
IELTS score: 7.5 
 
  APPENDIX  C :  CURRICULUM  V I TAE  
 - 69 - 
Cambridge FCE: grade B 
business-fluent in spoken and written 
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Spanish third foreign language 
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